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Introduction
From molecules to societies, nature is often (surprisingly) pat-terned and orderly. Although order is obviously crucial for 
systems such as DNA replication, it is less obvious why animal 
societies consisting of competing individuals should be orderly. 
In particular, biologists have long noted that dominance hier-
archies are surprisingly transitive (sometimes termed “linear”) 
(Landau 1951; Dawkins 1976; Lindquist and Chase 2009). May-
nard Smith (1983), from a more general perspective, felt that or-
derly queues in nonhuman societies posed a significant evolu-
tionary puzzle, because lower ranking animals should usually 
have strong incentive, and little disincentive, to disrupt the 
queue—any shuffle would be unlikely to worsen their lot, and 
might help it. He argued that external enforcement, such as the 
presence of police, would be required, and thought it unlikely 
that nonhuman animal societies would exhibit any structures 
for external enforcement. After being unable to create models 
with winner–loser effects sufficiently strong to explain the or-
derliness of dominance hierarchies, Lindquist and Chase (2009) 
proposed that the observed orderliness requires that “members 
of groups are intensely aware both of their own interactions as 
well as interactions occurring among other members of their 
group” (emphasis in the original). Regardless, nonhuman ani-
mal groups often form orderly hierarchies. 
Dominance is fundamentally a relation between 2 individu-
als (Bernstein 1981), whereby, after 1 or more contests or inter-
actions, 1 individual assumes the dominant role and the other 
the subordinate role. Indeed, characteristic submissive behav-
iors that terminate a conflict (Chase 1980) may be the essen-
tial determinant of the relation (Rowell 1974). The mechanics 
of how the relation is established, and the various costs and 
benefits of high dominance rank, can vary widely among spe-
cies (Ellis 1995). Dominance data are usually presented as a ta-
ble or matrix of contests or interactions, in which the members 
of the group are listed in both the rows and columns, with 
wins shown in the rows and losses in the columns. Any such 
matrix or table is directly equivalent to the adjacency matrix, 
a standard input form for social network data (Wasserman 
and Faust 1994; see p. 153 for extension of the adjacency ma-
trix concept from binary to weighted matrices), meaning that 
dominance data are naturally amenable to analysis as a so-
cial network. A dominance network then consists of nodes (an-
imals; the number of nodes is therefore the size of the group 
included in the dominance dataset) and directed edges (arrows 
pointing from winner to loser). The bidirectional edges of this 
contest matrix will be weighted by the number of contests won 
by the contestant at the source of the edge (arrow). Despite the 
natural emphasis on the observed contests, dominance/subor-
dinance is fundamentally a yes/no relation, so a natural ex-
tension of the network perspective is to consider an outcome 
matrix that denotes the 0/1 dominant–subordinate relation for 
each dyad. The outcome matrix will be binary (0/1) and di-
rected, with 1-way edges pointing from dominant to subordi-
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Abstract
Dominance is a social relation between a subordinate animal and the dominant to which it submits. Animal groups 
seem regularly to form dominance hierarchies in which dominance relations are transitive and stable, but compara-
tive studies are rare. Dominance hierarchies can be formalized as social networks, with arrows (directed edges) point-
ing from dominant animals (nodes) to subordinates. Using this network perspective, we explored the orderliness of 
40 published datasets for taxa from ants to elephants. To quantify orderliness, we used the triad census, a technique 
from sociology, that enumerates the proportion of orderly (transitive) triads (e.g., A dominates B and C, B dominates 
C, yielding clear top, middle, and bottom rankings) versus disorderly (cyclic) triads (e.g., A dominates B, B domi-
nates C, but C in turn dominates A). All 40 datasets showed a significant excess of orderly (transitive) triads and a 
deficit of disorderly (cyclic) triads compared with the null model of random networks. Most datasets showed rela-
tively high rank stability (mean stability index of 0.81 on a scale from 0 to 1). Steep hierarchies arise when the scores 
used to rank contestants differ sharply, further promoting stability. All 40 dominance hierarchies were steeper than 
expected from randomized sequences of contests. The overwhelming conclusion was that animal groups are orderly, 
as assessed by a high proportion of transitive relations, a paucity of disorderly cycles, and high temporal stability in 
rankings. Thus, a certain degree of self-organization may characterize even agonistic interactions across many differ-
ent kinds of animal societies. 
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nate. The individual winning the majority of contests for each 
dyad in the contest matrix receives a 1 in the outcome matrix, 
the majority loser a 0 (Chase 1980). One can assess the stabil-
ity of dominance relations by determining how the structure 
of those relations (i.e., the outcome network) is affected by the 
time ordering of its constituent contests. 
A fundamental component of any network is the triad, a set 
of 3 nodes (Faust 2007 , 2010). A network with n nodes has n-
choose-3 triadic combinations of individuals, and classifying the 
types of possible triads has long been a feature of the sociologi-
cal network literature (Holland and Leinhardt 1976). In a recent 
meta-analysis (Shizuka and McDonald 2012) of 101 published 
dominance datasets, we confirmed the striking orderliness of 
hierarchies, in terms of their relative lack of cyclic or nontransi-
tive relations (e.g., a triad in which A dominates B, and B dom-
inates C, but which becomes cyclic and disorderly if C domi-
nates A; Figure 1). Dominance dynamics may, therefore, join the 
growing evidence for varying degrees of self-organization in 
nature (Camazine 2001; Couzin and Krause 2003). 
In this study we assess, in more detail, the orderliness of 
dominance hierarchies from social network and other perspec-
tives, using 40 published datasets. We prefer the term order-
liness to linearity because it is more inclusive, and because it 
avoids conflation with the most widely used “linearity” met-
ric (de Vries 1995), derived from the work of Landau (1951), 
which we show (Shizuka and McDonald 2012) to be inevitably 
biased toward underestimating transitivity. The bias toward 
underestimating orderliness in the de Vries metric, which we 
avoid by assessing transitivity (Shizuka and McDonald 2012) 
rather than “linearity,” arises from the necessity for random 
imputation about unknown relations (null dyads). Null dy-
ads are those in which individuals do not establish a domi-
nance relation, perhaps because of insufficient observer effort, 
or, more interestingly, because of active avoidance based on 
third-party observer effects (Oliveira et al. 1998). For technical 
reasons (reviewed in de Vries 1995), null dyads complicate the 
assessment of Landau’s (1951) linearity index. Unfortunately, 
random imputation of the outcomes of null dyads creates a 
potentially problematic side effect, especially for sparse net-
works. In random directed networks, which often serve as null 
models against which to assess observed networks (Wasser-
man and Faust 1994), the proportion of triangles (triads with 
all 3 edges present) that are transitive (A dominates B and C, B 
dominates C) is only 0.75 (Faust 2010) and fully 0.25 are intran-
sitive Cycles (no clear dominant, as described in the previous 
paragraph). Empirical dominance data, viewed as networks, 
rarely show anywhere close to a proportion of 0.25 intransitive 
Cycles (Shizuka and McDonald 2012). Thus, random imputa-
tion forces disorder into systems that may otherwise be highly 
orderly. We further prefer the term orderliness because it cap-
tures both the ability to ordinate animals from most to least 
dominant, and the temporal stability of that rank order. 
As we use the term, therefore, orderliness depends on 3 
emergent features: 1) transitivity (“linearity”), 2) stability (fre-
quency of rank change over time), and 3) rank steepness (dis-
parity in rank scores—steep hierarchies mean upsets are less 
likely to cause overall rank changes). Metrics useful for as-
sessing our 3 criteria for the orderliness of dominance hierar-
chies include the proportion of transitive versus cycle triads, 
readily implemented via the network technique known as the 
triad census (Holland and Leinhardt 1976), rank scores (as a ba-
sis for ordination), the temporal stability of the rank ordering, 
and the steepness of the hierarchy, meaning the differences 
among the scores used to determine ranks. Although numer-
ous dominance ranking schemes exist, Elo rating, a rank-score 
system derived from chess, has the huge advantage of dealing 
very well with “missing” data (dyads that do not interact), is 
implemented (dynamically) from the simple time-ordered se-
quence of dyadic outcomes, and is readily assessed for tempo-
ral stability (Neumann et al. 2011). 
Although orderliness is an emergent property of a group or 
society, individuals can clearly play pivotal roles in speeding 
or slowing the emergence of order. Analyses of temporal se-
quences of social network configuration have provided useful 
insights into the importance of network position as a predic-
tor of reproductive success for individuals (McDonald 2007). 
Likewise, social network approaches have proved useful for 
identifying individuals that may play a key role in promoting 
(Flack et al. 2006) or reducing the orderliness of social groups. 
A key concept in social network theory is node centrality, the 
extent to which a node is connected to other nodes in the net-
work (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Centrality is most simply 
assessed as degree, the number of nodes to which a given node 
is directly connected. Many other metrics exist for assess-
ing centrality, including betweenness and eigenvector centrality 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 169). These various centrality 
metrics can help identify individuals that, despite their pivotal 
role, may not be obviously high ranking or successful. The in-
volvement of individuals in particular triad types in the triad 
census can help uncover such pivotal individuals. For exam-
ple, for networks with several cycles, one could ask whether 
particular individuals are overrepresented in cycle member-
ship. If so, one could ask whether those individuals also show 
high levels of centrality from a social network perspective. In 
that case, their disappearance or removal could result in a re-
duction in cyclicity, as well as in major changes in network 
structure and even function, as found for high-ranking pri-
mates by Flack et al. (2006). 
In a series of pioneering studies, Chase (e.g., 1985) used a 
“jigsaw puzzle” and triadic approach to study the sequences 
of dominance interactions. In this study, we build on that re-
search, by proposing that tracking of the ontogeny of domi-
nance contests in the explicitly social network approach of, for 
example, the triad census, should allow researchers to exam-
Figure 1. The types of triads possible when asymmetric edges (1-way arrows pointing from dominant to subordinate) join nodes (animals). Any 
network containing n nodes has n-choose-3 triads. Each of the n-choose-3 triads can be classified as 1 of the 7 distinct (nonisomorphic) triad types 
shown above. The count of triad types is called a triad census. The inherently transitive (orderly) types, Double-dominant, Double-loser, and Transi-
tive, are underlined. The 2-edge triad type that we term Pass-along can become either cyclic (disorderly; if the third edge points up) or transitive 
(orderly; if the edge points down), if and when the third edge (dominance relation) is established. 
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ine and experiment with sequences of interactions and their 
causes and consequences, within a rich theoretical framework. 
We assess patterns of order and disorder in our set of 40 pub-
lished datasets from the perspective of transitivity, the stability 
and steepness of rank hierarchies, and the pattern of involve-
ment of individuals in cycles, because cycles are a fundamen-
tal source of disorder in dominance hierarchies. If orderli-
ness prevails, then transitivity should be high relative to a null 
model based on comparison with random directed networks, 
the hierarchies should be relatively stable across sequences of 
contests, and the scores that determine rank orderings should 
drop steeply across the hierarchy. If certain individuals play 
a pivotal disorder-inducing role in those groups that are less 
orderly (have more cycles), then we should expect that they 
would be overrepresented in cyclic relations. 
Materials and Methods
Empirical datasets
We analyzed 40 published datasets (Appendix 1) that mea-
sured dominance contests among conspecific animals. With 
4 exceptions, the datasets were a subset of a larger sample of 
101 datasets used for a meta-analysis (Shizuka and McDonald 
2012) of patterns of transitivity (linearity) in a variety of taxa, 
including captive and natural populations. We selected only 
studies that included a raw table of dominance contests, al-
though the criteria for outcome varied (e.g., direct aggression 
and subordination signals). All the datasets in this study in-
cluded group sizes of at least 10 animals, to facilitate certain 
analyses that become problematic for very small numbers of 
animals. Further, we restricted our choice to datasets that were 
not tournaments. In a tournament, every dyad has a relation 
(no null dyads, or double-zeros in the data matrix). Tourna-
ments are very rare in nature, except in experimental, captive 
situations for relatively small groups, where the possibility ex-
ists that interactions cannot be avoided, even if one or other 
of the interactors would have been an avoider in nature. Be-
cause tournaments may be subject to unnatural circumstances, 
such as forced contests that either or both contestants might 
avoid in nature, they may produce artifacts such as desperado 
effects (Grafen 1987) that we felt might obscure the fundamen-
tal structural dynamics of the networks. 
Contest matrix, outcome matrix, adjacency matrix, triad cen-
sus, and network metrics
All input data were contest matrices found as tables or fig-
ures in the 40 published studies. From each weighted, directed 
contest matrix we computed an unweighted, directed 1/0 out-
come matrix, using the majority-win and draw-elimination cri-
teria described in the next paragraph. The contest and out-
come matrices are directly equivalent to adjacency matrices 
(Newman 2003), one of the most widely used forms of input 
for network analyses. In the resulting networks, the nodes are 
individual animals and the edges are either numbers of con-
tests won or lost (contest matrix) or 1/0 dominance relations 
(outcome matrix). 
Unresolved contest sets (draws, in which each contestant 
wins an equal number of contests) present a potential source 
of uncertainty and concern for analysis of dominance hierar-
chies. For example, in assigning outcomes, draws could be 
designated by a 0 for each participant (Chase 1980), or by a 
score of 0.5 for each (Appleby 1983). We will use the former 
convention, whereby draws result in a 0 for each contestant. 
We justify eliminating draws for 3 reasons. 1) It simplifies the 
network perspective, by yielding a network with only asym-
metric edges (1-way arrows from a clear dominant to the clear 
subordinate) and no mutual edges (Holland and Leinhardt 
1976). 2) Ignoring draws leads to a simpler triad census (Fig-
ure 1), a social network technique (Holland and Leinhardt 
1976) that we use to quantify the distribution of triadic con-
figurations (Chase 1982; Faust 2010) in the dominance datas-
ets. We were particularly interested in those triad types, such 
as Cycles (Figure 1) that pertain directly to the orderliness of 
the social structure. The triad census for a network with mu-
tual edges has 16 types; if draws (mutual edges) are ignored 
only 7 easily interpreted types exist (Figure 1). 3) Draws were 
rare and, as discussed below, we tested the robustness of our 
conclusions by conducting analyses in which draws were not 
ignored. Of our 40 datasets, 15 had no draws at all. Of the 25 
datasets that did have draws, fewer than 2% of the dyads had 
sets of contests resulting in draws, and they accounted for just 
1.3% of the total number of contests. When dyads did engage 
in bouts of contests that resulted in draws, the mean number 
of contests was 1.8±1.3, meaning they were rarely protracted, 
and therefore not greatly different from the 0/0 that would 
have resulted had no contest occurred. Further, the vast major-
ity of dyadic outcomes that did not result in draws had highly 
lopsided contest counts. 
From each outcome matrix, we computed the triad census 
using routines in the Statnet (Handcock et al. 2003) and iGraph 
(Csárdi and Nepusz 2006) packages of the R programming 
framework (R Development Core Team 2009). Only the 7 triad 
types shown in Figure 1 are possible for a network that has 
asymmetric (directed, 1-way) and null (missing) edges but not 
mutual (directed, 2-way) edges. R scripts for all analyses can 
be found on the senior author’s website: http://www.uwyo.
edu/dbmcd/mcd.html. The number of triads in a network is 
a combinatorial (n-choose-3) function of the number of nodes, 
and increases rapidly with node number (group size), n (n = 
4, 4 triads; n = 6, 20; n = 8, 56; n = 10, 120). Note that triads are 
not likely to be independent; for example, with individuals la-
beled alphabetically, several triads could include individual A 
(e.g., ACE, ADH, and AFJ). Such nonindependence invalidates 
some traditional statistical tests and requires randomization 
procedures, such as Mantel tests. 
We calculated the network density, d, defined as the propor-
tion of possible edges (nonzero outcome-matrix entries) that ac-
tually occur. Note that, because of our no-draw simplification, 
the maximum number of cells that can be filled is one-half the 
number of nondiagonal cells (i.e., equals the number of cells in 
the upper diagonal, in a perfectly transitive hierarchy). Thus, if 
e is the number of directed edges in the network (values of 1 
in the outcome matrix), the density of the outcome matrix, d = 
e/[0.5 × n × (n – 1)], is twice the conventional metric for other 
types of networks, such as undirected networks; the difference 
arises because no mutual edges are allowed. That is, any rever-
sals (a 1 in a lower diagonal cell of the matrix, meaning that a 
lower ranking animal dominates a higher ranking animal) 
must be balanced by a 0 in the corresponding cell of the up-
per diagonal of the 1/0 outcome matrix. We also calculated the 
global clustering coefficient, which is well described in New-
man (2003). From the perspective of an individual (node), the 
global clustering coefficient can be interpreted as the probabil-
ity that the 2 neighbors of a given node are themselves each oth-
er’s neighbors. The higher the clustering coefficient, the more 
densely interconnected the nodes in the network are. We also 
calculated betweenness, a centrality measure that assesses how 
often a node lies along the shortest paths between all pairs of 
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nodes in the network, to ascertain whether individuals involved 
in Cycles also showed high network centrality. 
Calculation of triangle transitivity, Ttri, for empirical 
networks 
Networks with noninteractions (null dyads) complicate 
the calculation of “linearity.” One of the leading methods for 
calculating the linearity of a dominance hierarchy (de Vries 
1998) requires repeated, imputed (random) fills of null dy-
ads, a requirement that we suggest cause consistent underes-
timation of the true transitivity (linearity) of animal societies 
(Shizuka and McDonald 2012). A complete network, with no 
missing dyadic outcomes, is known as a tournament. For net-
works, such as our outcome networks, with only asymmetric 
edges, a tournament has only 2 of the 7 types of triads—Tran-
sitives (Figure 1; A dominates B and C, B dominates C, yield-
ing a clear top, middle, and bottom animal) and Cycles (Fig-
ure 1; A dominates B, which dominates C, which dominates 
A, yielding no clear top animal). For a tournament, therefore, 
the transitivity would be simply the proportion of the Transi-
tive triangles divided by the sum of the Transitives and Cycles. 
Nevertheless, even if incomplete triads occur, a straightfor-
ward and relatively assumption-free measure of transitivity is 
possible (Shizuka and McDonald 2012), using only the propor-
tion of transitive triangles relative to the total of Transitive tri-
angles and Cycles, scaled relative to the null expectation (from 
random directed networks; Faust 2007, 2010) of a proportion 
of 0.75 of transitive triangles. We call this measure the triangle 
transitivity, ttri. It is calculated as: 
 ttri = 4
 (      Ntransitive             –  0.75)               Ntransitive + Ncycle                   (1) 
where Ntransitive and Ncycle refer to the number of Transitive 
triads and Cycles, respectively, computed in the triad census 
(Holland and Leinhardt 1976; Figure 1). The value of t tri usu-
ally ranges from 0, when the proportion of transitive triangles 
equals the random expectation of 0.75, to 1, when only transi-
tive triangles occur. Although the value of t tri can be slightly 
negative when Transitive triangles constitute less than the 0.75 
random expected proportion, negative t tri values seem rarely 
to occur in empirical networks (e.g., 0 of 101 dominance net-
works in Shizuka and McDonald 2012). 
Generation of random networks and observed minus expected 
triad census
Random networks have long served as the core “null 
model” for network analyses (Erdös and Renyi 1960; Was-
serman and Faust 1994; Watts and Strogatz 1998). For our 
purposes, the most important feature of random directed 
networks is that their expected proportion (from among all tri-
angles—triads with all 3 “legs”) of Transitive triangles is 0.75, 
whereas their expected proportion of Cycles is 0.25. Our major 
use of replicate random networks in this article is to generate 
“expected” frequencies of the 7 distinct (nonisomorphic) triad 
types shown in Figure 1. Pass-along triads can play a pivotal 
role in the emerging orderliness of a group because, depend-
ing on the directionality of the third edge in the event of a con-
test between the noninteracting dyad, they can become either 
Cycles (disorderly) or Transitive (orderly) triads. That is, ev-
ery Cycle has a Pass-along as a precursor, but not all Pass-alongs 
will become Cycles. Thus, if for example, a dataset has a pau-
city of Pass-alongs, one can infer that Cycles might also show a 
deficit in those 2-edge triads for which the third edge forms. 
The other 2 two-edge triad types, Double-dominant and Double-
subordinate, are necessarily orderly. No matter which way the 
third edge points they will become Transitive triangles. 
We used R scripts to analyze the empirical dominance da-
tasets and to generate 10 000 replicate random networks cor-
responding to each empirical network. We constrained the 10 
000 random directed networks to have the same number of 
nodes (animals) and edges (dominance relations) as the com-
parator empirical network. In network parlance, such net-
works are known as dyad census-conditioned uniform ran-
dom graphs, which we generated using StatNet’s (Handcock 
et al. 1993) rguman function in R. For each random replicate, 
we calculated the difference between the (expected) percent-
age of a particular triad type in the random (null model) graph 
replicate and the (observed) percentage of the given triad type 
in the empirical, published dominance dataset. We then plot-
ted the mean observed versus expected difference with a 95% 
confidence interval derived from the 2.5 to 97.5 percentiles of 
the 10 000 observed minus expected difference values. Any ob-
served versus expected confidence intervals that do not over-
lap 0 are therefore significantly positive at the 5% level (i.e., 
showing an excess of that triad type in the empirical network 
compared with the random, null expectation) or negative (def-
icit of that type of triad in the empirical network). 
Assessing the effect of outcome uncertainty
The number of contests that determines the 1/0 dominance 
relation varies among dyads within a dataset and across da-
tasets. A contest set in which 1 animal wins 23 contests and 
the other wins 1 is clearly a much more certain outcome than 
a contest set in which 1 wins 23 contests and the other 22. We 
assessed the effect of this form of uncertainty by reversing the 
1/0 outcomes for all contest sets that were close (the number 
of wins differed only by 1). Further, rather than simply ig-
noring draws (giving them a 0/0 outcome), we randomly as-
signed a dominance outcome to dyads whose contest sets 
resulted in a nonzero draw. Note that such a random assign-
ment should favor the emergence of disorder, because ran-
dom graphs have an expectation of 25% cycles, an expectation 
virtually never observed in published datasets (Shizuka and 
McDonald 2012). We used these rules to reassess the orderli-
ness of the 8 datasets with the highest proportion of close and 
drawn contest sets. 
Static versus dynamic calculation of rank order
Many analyses of dominance relations do not require as-
signing ranks. For example, triad census analyses and central-
ity measures do not depend on assignment of rank, although 
rank may often be useful as a node or individual attribute, just 
as one might use gender or age as an attribute. Optimal rank 
ordering can depend on, among other factors, whether the 
data are 1) static (fixed at a single point in time), represented 
by a “final” result, such as that found in many published stud-
ies, or 2) dynamic, where the entire sequence of dyadic con-
tests and their outcomes is available, which is rarely the case 
in published studies. Although multiple alternative ranking 
methods exist (Hemelrijk et al. 2005; Whitehead 2008), most 
were highly correlated for our datasets. We used the well-justi-
fied method of de Vries (1998) for “static” rankings calculated 
from the summary contest matrices. The goal of de Vries’s 
method is to arrange the rows and columns to be, as much as 
possible, in the upper triangular of the matrix, similar to the 
upper triangularization bandwidth problem in linear algebra 
(Axler 1996). A perfectly linear hierarchy would have no non-
zero cells below the diagonal. Recently, Neumann et al. (2011; 
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see also Albers and de Vries 2001) proposed the dynamic, up-
datable Elo-rating method, developed for rating chess players 
(Elo 1978), as useful for the context of dominance. The method 
proceeds by starting all contestants with the same initial score 
(e.g., 1000, as implemented here) and then having an incre-
ment/decrement for the winner and loser of each contest (e.g., 
100, as implemented here). Scores are interpolated across the 
intervals in which group members do not engage in contests. 
The result is a set of scores, dynamically updated after each 
contest, from which ranks can be assigned. Elo rating has the 
advantage of dealing very well with “missing” data (null dy-
ads that do not interact), can be implemented (dynamically) 
from the simple sequence of dyadic contests, and can be read-
ily assessed for temporal stability (Neumann et al. 2011), using 
a method that we modify to range from 0 (unstable) to 1 (sta-
ble), as described below. 
Simulation of contest trajectories, rank stability, and 
hierarchy steepness
The datasets we analyzed were “static” endpoint tables, 
summarizing contest data. They did not, therefore, provide 
the detailed sequence of contest outcomes required for Elo-rat-
ing analysis. The numbers in the contest matrices represented 
the set of all observed dyadic contests in the original data, 
but did not contain any information on the actual sequence in 
which the contests occurred. Because we did not have the raw 
data with which to generate the actual sequences, we gener-
ated a set of 200 replicate putative sequences for each of the 40 
datasets, by randomly selecting and “backdropping” observed 
contests. Backdropping consisted of randomly removing con-
tests, one by one, with uniform probability, until only a sin-
gle contest remained, while keeping a (backwards) list of the 
sequence of contests. Each random removal generated a win-
ner–loser dyad, resulting in a (backward) sequence of dyadic 
contests. Once the backwards list was reversed, we had an es-
timated time-ordered sequence of contest outcomes for a more 
dynamic exploration of the ontogeny of the hierarchy. That is, 
each sequence had winners in 1 column and losers in the other, 
with the number of rows equaling the sum of all the numbers, 
∑C ij, where the C ij are the matrix elements in the original con-
test matrix with i rows and j = i columns. Note that, because 
we dropped observed contests, no imputation of outcome was 
required (only of their temporal order). The total number of 
contests in the datasets (sum of all the numbers in the contest 
matrix) ranged from as few as 44 to as many as 2231, mean-
ing that some simulations were computation intensive. We re-
peated the randomized backdropping across 200 runs for each 
dataset. The 200 putative sequences (each of the 200 replicates 
ranged in length from 44 contests to 2231 across the 40 data-
sets), then served as input to create Elo-rating trajectories—a 
sequence of Elo scores that we used to generate rank orderings 
that could be dynamically updated, contest by contest. Analy-
ses for each Elo-rating simulation (examples presented in Fig-
ure 4) were computation intensive, taking up to several hours 
to run a single contest trajectory (on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7 
MacBook™). We checked the robustness of the random back-
dropping procedure in 2 ways: 1) we calculated the standard 
deviation (SD) of the estimate across the 200 replicates, and 
by comparing the mean and median to check for skewed dis-
tributions. A small SD would mean that any of the replicate 
runs is a reasonable representative of the process, and suggest 
that the actual sequence was unlikely to have differed greatly 
from the sequence obtained by the simulated backdrop pro-
cedure. A small difference between mean and median would 
mean that the distribution of estimates across the runs did not 
have a long tail, reducing the possibility that the actual (un-
published) sequence differed from most of the simulated back-
drop replicates. 2) We compared the outcome of our random 
backdropping estimate of the rank stability index with that 
calculated from the actual temporally ordered data for a study 
(Wittemyer and Getz 2007) whose raw data the authors made 
available to us. 
The stability of rank orders across time (measured as se-
quential contests) is one of the factors we considered in assess-
ing the orderliness of the 40 dominance hierarchies. For each 
of the 200 simulated trajectories, we computed a stability in-
dex that assesses how frequently rank switches occur. The sta-
bility index proposed by Neumann et al. (2011) has 2 unfortu-
nate attributes: an upper bound that varies with group size, 
and a range from a counterintuitive “most stable” = 0 to “less 
stable” for higher values that depend on group size. We there-
fore modified the Neumann stability index to range from 0 
(completely unstable) to 1 (most stable), independent of group 
size. Our modified stability index is 
St = 1 –  S              2n                    (2) 
where n is the number of animals in the group, and S is Neu-
mann et al.’s (2011) stability index (their Equation 5). Note that 
their stated maximum for S is a typographical error that should 
be 2 × n not 2/n as typeset because maximal instability occurs 
for the summed absolute differences of completely reversed 
rank orders. For comparing stability (described above; Equa-
tion 2) across the datasets, we calculated the mean value across 
the 200 runs, and used the simulation closest to the mean when 
producing figures representing rank-score trajectories for that 
dataset. We checked both the mean-median difference of the 
stability index and the SD across the 200 runs to check whether 
any particular simulated run was likely to be representative of 
the actual (unpublished) sequence of contests. 
For the representative (mean) trajectory, we also computed 
the steepness of the final Elo-rating ranking (i.e., we computed 
the Elo ratings, and thereby the rank order, at the point where 
all the backdropped contests had been restored to the contest 
matrix). Because the distribution of Elo-rating scores within a 
hierarchy is often decidedly skewed, we used the Gini coeffi-
cient as an index of steepness, rather than the slope of linearly 
regressing rank against score that was proposed by de Vries et 
al. (2006). The Gini coefficient is often used, in other contexts, 
as a measure of inequality derived from the Lorenz curve 
(Weiner and Solbrig 1984; Wittebole et al. 2009). The Gini co-
efficient is given by: 
G =
 ∑ni =1 ∑
n
j =1 xi – xj
              2n2µ                         (3) 
where the xi are the Elo scores for the n individuals in the 
group, and µ is the mean score (Equation 2 in Damgaard and 
Weiner 2000). Because it is a single-number summary, the Gini 
coefficient does not contain all the information about the curve. 
That is, 2 differently shaped curves can have the same Gini co-
efficient. As a supplement to the Gini coefficient, Damgaard 
and Weiner (2000), therefore, proposed also assessing the Lo-
renz asymmetry coefficient, whose value is <1 if the bulge of the 
curve lies below an imaginary line of slope –1, and >1 if the 
bulge lies above the imaginary line of slope –1. Values of the co-
efficient <1 can be interpreted to mean that the main source of 
inequality arises from individuals with low scores (low-ranked 
individuals), whereas values >1 mean inequality attributable to 
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top-ranking individuals. As the basis for significance testing, 
on each of 1000 iterations we first randomly reassigned win-
ner and loser status in the ∑Cij rows of the contest sequence set 
produced by the backdropping technique described above. We 
then calculated the Gini coefficient for the randomly adjusted 
sequence set. Finally, we assessed the significance of the ob-
served Gini coefficient by its placement in the set of 1000 ran-
domized Gini coefficients. As a further measure of the source 
of the inequality, we computed the Gini coefficient for just the 
4 top-ranked individuals in the hierarchy. A high value of this 
“top 4” Gini coefficient would mean that the scores dropped off 
sharply even among the top-ranked individuals. Because bene-
fits, but perhaps sometimes costs (Gesquiere et al. 2011) likely 
accrue most importantly to top-ranked individuals, pinpointing 
the location of the “bulge” in the Lorenz curve should be useful 
when comparing the steepness characteristics of different datas-
ets, or the same dataset over time. 
Results
The 40 datasets had a mean of 16.3 nodes (range 10–38, SD 
= 6.2) and 87.7 edges (range 19–409, SD = 77.6) in the 1/0 out-
come matrix, derived from the raw contest matrices presented 
in the source articles. The datasets were sparse, containing 
many noninteracting dyads, yielding a mean density of 0.66 
(proportion of all possible edges that actually occurred; Ap-
pendix 2), with most of the high values occurring in captive 
or experimental situations. The total number of contests in the 
contest matrix averaged 559.6 (range 44–2231). Draws were 
rare, averaging 1.8% of the dyadic contest sets, with no draws 
at all occurring in 15 of the 40 datasets. Draws tended to occur 
between animals closer in rank than expected. The mean rank 
difference between animals whose contest bouts resulted in a 
draw was 3.1 versus an expected mean rank difference of 6.3. 
Figure 2 shows dominance-related metrics whose possible val-
ues fall in the interval from 0 to 1. The triangle transitivity in-
dex, t tri, varied from a low value of 0.37 to a maximum of 1.0 
(x¯  = 0.88, SD = 0.16). In 33 of the 40 datasets, none of the 10 000 
random network t tri overlapped with the observed t tri value 
(P < 0.0001). Only 1 dataset (Natoli and DeVito 1991), for fe-
ral cats Felis sylvestris catus, had a nonsignificant (P = 0.27) dif-
ference between the observed and random t tri (Appendix 2). 
Nine of the 40 datasets were for birds, 9 were for primates, 18 
were for nonprimate mammals, 2 were for fish, and 2 for in-
vertebrates. For none of the metrics presented in Figure 2 was 
there any clear pattern of difference among these broad taxon 
groups (Appendix 2). 
Although the pattern of triad distributions for the triad cen-
sus (Figure 3 and Appendix 3) varied across the 40 datasets, a 
typical pattern was to have a significant excess of Double-domi-
nant (27 of 40), and Transitive triads (38 of 40), and a significant 
deficit of Pass-along (true of 35 of 40) and Cycle triads (38 of 40). 
The deficit of Cycles was even more pronounced than the def-
icit of Pass-alongs for the majority (22 of 40) of datasets, mean-
ing that the mean observed minus expected percentage was 
more negative, and the upper end of the 95% confidence in-
terval further from the zero line for Cycles than for Pass-alongs 
(Figure 3). Thirteen of the 40 datasets had no Cycles at all (Ap-
pendix 2); on average, Cycles represented only 1.0% of the to-
tal triads in the datasets. Only 1 dataset (Poisbleau et al. 2006, 
Figure 2a; 8.4%) had >5% Cycles. Only 1 dataset (Nakano 1994; 
red-spotted masu salmon; Figure 3, middle) had a mean ob-
served minus expected difference for Pass-alongs that was pos-
itive, although its 95% CI overlapped zero. 
Outcome uncertainty did not affect the conclusion that 
dominance structures are orderly. Uncertainty about the dom-
inant-subordinate relation is highest for contest sets resulting 
in nonzero draws and close sets (wins differing from losses by 
a single contest). Draws were rare (mean proportion < 0.02; 
Appendix 2) and close contests never exceeded 6% of the to-
tal contests. None of the 8 datasets with the highest number of 
close contest sets and draws (highlighted by an asterisk next to 
the taxon name in Appendix 2) showed any change in the dis-
tribution of observed versus expected outcomes for the triad 
census under the uncertainty reversal routine. That is, in all 
cases, regardless of the reversal of 1/0 dominance outcomes, 
the datasets showed the same pattern of significant excess of 
Double-dominant and Transitive triads, and a deficit of Pass-
along and Cycle triads. 
The trajectories of rank orderings (Figure 4), evaluated by 
Elo rating (Neumann et al. 2011), varied across the 40 datasets, 
with a mean stability index of 0.81 (SD = 0.13, range 0.54–0.98; 
Appendix 2). A stability index value near 1 means that the 
rank orders (determined by continually updated Elo scores) 
rarely changed, as shown by a fairly typical paucity of line 
crossing in Figure 4B. Lower values of the stability index indi-
cate more frequent rank order changes, as shown by frequent 
line crossings for one of the least stable dominance rank orders 
in Figure 4A. Within each of the 40 datasets, the stability in-
dex estimate varied little across the 200 replicate backdropped 
runs (mean SD = 0.02) and all means and medians were very 
similar, meaning that any of the replicate backdropped contest 
sequences was reasonably representative of all the other runs. 
Further, for the 1 dataset (Wittemyer and Getz 2007) for which 
we were able to compute the stability index from the actual 
raw data, the actual (0.586) and estimated (0.557) values were 
very similar. The stability index was highly correlated with 
the Gini coefficient, a measure of the steepness of the ranking 
scores (Figure 5; R2adj = 0.67, F = 80.03, df = 38, P < 0.0001). The 
Gini coefficients for the 40 datasets ranged from 0.08 to 0.41 (x¯ 
= 0.18, SD = 0.07; Appendix 2). 
By measuring the asymmetry of Lorenz curves for the 
Elo-rating rank scores, one can determine whether the steep-
ness of rank-score differences are driven mainly by inequali-
ties among the top-ranked or the bottom-ranked individuals 
(see Methods; Damgaard and Weiner 2000). For the 40 datas-
ets, the Lorenz asymmetry coefficient (Figure 6) ranged from 
0.75 (meaning that the inequalities occurred mostly in the top 
half of the hierarchy) to 1.42 (meaning that the inequalities oc-
curred mainly in the bottom half of the hierarchy). About half 
Figure 2. Box-and-whisker plots for various metrics for the 40 datas-
ets. The heavy horizontal line denotes the median. The box spans the 
25–75th percentiles of the data. The vertical dashed lines encompass 
either the range of the data, or, if outliers exist (open circles), 1.5 times 
the interquartile range of the data. 1) Gini coefficient of inequality (a 
measure of the steepness of the rank scores using Elo rating); 2) Elo-
rating rank stability index; 3) density of the outcome matrix; 4) global 
clustering coefficient; 5) triangle transitivity, ttri, the expected t tri in a 
random network is 0; 6) proportion of dyads whose contest bouts re-
sulted in draws. 
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the datasets (22) had asymmetry coefficients <1. The mean Lo-
renz asymmetry coefficient across all 40 datasets was 1.0, the 
value associated with a symmetric curve. Because the most 
important rank score differences should be those involving the 
top-ranked individuals, we also assessed the Gini coefficient 
for just the 4 top-ranked individuals in each dataset, which 
was weakly but significantly correlated with the Lorenz asym-
metry coefficient (R2adj = 0.08, F = 4.3, df = 38, P < 0.05). De-
spite the range of values for the Gini and Lorenz asymmetry 
coefficients, all 40 datasets had observed Gini coefficients that 
were significantly (P < 0.001) higher than the expected (ran-
domized sequence sets) values, meaning that they were all 
“steep,” despite varying in degree of steepness and in where 
the steepest part of the drop in scores occurred. 
In the 27 dominance networks with 1 or more triadic Cy-
cles (Appendix 2), certain individuals tended to be overrepre-
sented as participants in these disorder-inducing interactions. 
For example, in the data for female African elephants, Lox-
odonta africana, of Wittemyer and Getz (2007), female R37 (13th 
in the rank order) was involved in the only 2 Cycles, which 
otherwise had no overlapping members. In 1 Cycle, she dom-
inated the female 5 ranks above her, whereas in the other Cy-
cle she was dominated by a female 2 ranks below her. Interest-
ingly, elephant R37 was both old (usually positively correlated 
with high rank) and small (usually negatively correlated with 
high rank; Wittemyer G, personal communication). Although 
this level of individual detail was not available for most of the 
other datasets, patterns of individual involvement in Cycles 
Figure 3. Difference (mean and 95% CI) between the observed (empirical data) and expected (random) triad percentage from the triad census for 3 
of the 40 dominance datasets. The y axis is the percentage (among n-choose-3 observed triads in the data) of the 7 triad types, minus the mean triad 
census percentage from 1000 random networks (+95% CI). Thus, y axis values are the difference between observed and expected percentage for 
the 7 possible triad types depicted by the diagrams along the x axis (see Figure 1). Using percentage allows comparison across networks of differ-
ent size. A) Ovis canadensis data, with a “typical” excess of Double-dominant and Transitive triads, and a deficit of Pass-along and Cycle triads. B) A 
less typical near-tournament in salmon data, consisting almost exclusively of Transitive and Cycle triangles. C) Another “less typical” pattern for 
Corvus monedula, whose 95% confidence interval for Pass-alongs extended well across both sides of the zero line, although the mean was still a def-
icit. All 3 datasets had a significant excess of Transitives and a significant deficit of Cycles. As was true for virtually all of the 40 datasets, therefore, 
the hierarchies were more orderly than expected by chance. 
Figure 4. Trajectory of Elo-rating scores (y axis) over a series of contests (x axis). A) Female American bison (Bison bison) had a rather low stability 
index of 0.57 (many rank changes) during the course of their 112 dyadic contests, although note the early and clear gap between the top-ranked in-
dividual and all the rest. B) Red-spotted masu salmon (Oncorhynchus masou ishikawai) data had a high stability index of 0.98 during the course of 
their series of 1732 dyadic contests. 
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had a few consistent patterns in the 40 datasets. For the 5 data-
sets with the largest number of Cycles (Appendix 2), those in-
dividuals most heavily involved in Cycles were generally mid-
ranking animals (mean normalized rank = 0.47 on a scale of 
0–1). One standard network metric of centrality, betweenness, 
was not well correlated with involvement in Cycles (R2 = 0.02, 
P > 0.05). Although individuals heavily involved in Cycles 
tended to have high betweenness, in no case did the individ-
ual with the highest betweenness also participate in the great-
est number of Cycles. 
Discussion
The overwhelming picture that emerges from our examina-
tion of the 40 datasets is that most are highly orderly, whether 
viewed through the lens of triangle transitivity, t tri, or from 
the perspective of the temporal Elo-rating stability (S¯t = 0.81 
on a scale from 0 to 1). Further, all 40 datasets had Gini coeffi-
cients (steepness measures) significantly greater than the ran-
dom expectation. A steep hierarchy means that the differences 
between ranks are greater, and therefore that the odds of rank 
changes, especially among individuals of nonadjacent rank, 
are less likely to occur. The results of the triad census analy-
ses (Appendix 3) also reinforce the conclusion of general or-
derliness, with their significant excesses of Double-dominant (27 
of 40 datasets) and Transitive (38 of 40) triads, and their signif-
icant deficits of Pass-along (35 of 40) and Cycle (38 of 40) triads. 
Note that, regardless of the eventual dominant in the “miss-
ing” edge of a Double-dominant triad, the only possible “filled” 
3-edge triangle is a Transitive. After a contest between the 
dyad in the “missing leg” of a Pass-along, it can become either 
a Transitive or a Cycle, depending on the direction of the edge 
that completes the triangle. Because the deficit of Cycles was 
even more pronounced than the deficit of Pass-alongs for the 
majority (22 of 40) of datasets (Appendix 3), the data suggested 
that a higher than expected proportion of previous Pass-alongs 
converted to Transitives, and a lower proportion than expected 
became Cycles. Thus, the finding that the “typical pattern” 
Figure 5. Relationship between the stability index for Elo-rating ranks 
and the Gini coefficient for the 40 dominance datasets. The Gini coeffi-
cient (derived from the Lorenz curve; range 0.08–0.41; Appendix 2) is 
a measure of inequality, and is larger for rankings with high disparity 
in Elo-rating scores of individuals in the hierarchy. The 0–1.0 stability 
index (Appendix 2), modified from Neumann et al. (2011), describes 
the frequency of rank order changes in a sequence of contests such as 
those depicted in Figure 4. Not surprisingly, steep hierarchies with 
steep differences in Elo-rating rank scores, as assessed by the Gini co-
efficient, also tended to show high stability of rank order. 
Figure 6. Lorenz curves for 2 representative datasets, with rank from lowest (n) to highest (1) on the x axis and normalized, cumulative final Elo-
rating score on the y axis. The shape informs as to whether rank inequality occurred mostly among animals in the top (Lorenz asymmetry coef-
ficient > 1) or bottom (Lorenz asymmetry coefficient < 1) half of the hierarchy respectively. A) For female chimpanzees, the rank inequality was 
less steep, but the bulk of the inequality came from high-ranked animals (bulge of the curve lies above an imaginary line of slope –1), as assessed 
by the Lorenz asymmetry coefficient (1.3). Also shown is the Gini coefficient (0.13) for the 4 top-ranked individuals, which is higher (steeper) than 
for the 4 top-ranked fish in B. B) For red-spotted masu salmon, the ranks dropped steeply, but the bulk of the inequality arose from the very low 
scores of the lowest-ranking animals (bulge of the curve lies below the imaginary line of slope –1), as assessed by the Lorenz coefficient (0.75). The 
Gini coefficient of the 4 top-ranked individuals (0.11) was less than that for the chimpanzee data. 
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(Appendix 3) includes an excess of Double-dominant triads and 
a deficit of Pass-along triads reinforces the 40-dataset pattern 
of orderliness suggested by the triangle transitivity index, ttri 
(Appendix 2), which considers only the proportions of Transi-
tive and Cycle triads. We can confidently conclude that, for the 
sample of dominance hierarchies examined here, triadic rela-
tions are more transitive than expected by chance, and that the 
hierarchies tend to be fairly steep and temporally stable (mean 
rank stability index of 0.81 on a scale of 0–1). To paraphrase 
Orwell (1945), all dominance hierarchies are orderly, even if 
some are more orderly than others. Furthermore, outcome un-
certainty arising from ignoring draws and from deeming indi-
viduals as dominant even if they won a contest set by a very 
narrow margin, such as 23 to 22, had no effect on the conclu-
sion of orderliness. Obviously, being dominant or subordinate 
might have major effects on all aspects of the lives of the indi-
viduals involved, but outcome uncertainty does not result in 
any higher order change in the fundamental orderliness of the 
group or society. 
The excess of Null triads in some of the datasets (signif-
icant excess in 13 of 40, trend in an additional 12; Appendix 
3), and the rather low mean density (d¯ = 0.67; Figure 2) of the 
40 outcome matrices, is consistent with the notion that empir-
ical datasets are often sparse. Many dyads never interact. Be-
cause many of these datasets were from intensive, long-term 
studies, it seems unlikely that the prevalence of null dyads 
can be explained away as merely a consequence of insuffi-
cient sampling or the low interactivity of a few individuals. In-
stead, they support the hypothesis of active avoidance driven 
by bystander effects, whereby observing the interactions of 
others influences an actor’s subsequent interaction probabil-
ity (Oliveira et al. 1998). Such nonrandom patterns of avoid-
ance likely contribute to the striking scarcity of cyclic triads in 
dominance hierarchies, and to the near-universal observation 
that, even after long observation of natural groups of animals, 
many null dyads persist. That is, despite abundant opportu-
nity, many dominance interactions fail to occur. 
Viewing dominance data at a range of scales from dyadic to 
triadic and at the level of the group as a whole can enrich our 
understanding of process and can help to suggest hypotheses 
subject to observational and experimental test. Although dyadic 
interactions may largely determine higher level network prop-
erties (Faust 2007), examining triadic patterns (Broom et al. 2009; 
Faust 2010) is worthwhile, as demonstrated by the results from 
the triad census analyses. The broad “typical” pattern (Figure 3) 
of a significant excess of Double-dominant and Transitive triads, 
and a significant deficit of Pass-along and Cycle triads, suggests 
that disparate taxa and functionally different social groupings 
may tend to share certain common features whereby orderly 
groupings provide at least some benefits, of various sorts (e.g., 
reduced time spent in agonistic encounters), to all group mem-
bers (Flack et al. 2006). Chase (1982) pointed out that Pass-alongs 
could form in 1 of 2 ways. If the 3 members of the triad are des-
ignated A, B, and C and the Pass-along consists of A dominat-
ing B and B dominating C, either the A–B leg or the B–C leg 
could arise first. The sequence of contests is an important com-
ponent of the outcome in dominance relations. For example, if 
Pass-alongs generally arise because A dominates B followed by 
B dominating C, that result weakens support for the loser effect 
hypothesis, whereby losers become entrained to lose or to avoid 
contests. Unfortunately, most published data are “static” sum-
maries of cumulative dominance contests, and the detailed time 
ordering of contests, an inevitable feature of the raw data, is 
rarely presented in the published study. In this study, we have 
attempted to analyze the dynamic stability of dominance rela-
tions using a random backdrop procedure. Careful consider-
ation of the temporal dynamics of dominance relations from the 
raw data, using methods such as R codes to calculate the stabil-
ity index, could produce many more insights into the processes 
that lead to order in animal societies. Such studies could illumi-
nate the role of early contest outcomes, third-party observer ef-
fects on dominance dynamics, and the plausibility of winner or 
loser effects, and help to assess whether avoidance is an impor-
tant factor in creating the sparseness of dominance matrices. 
Primates are sometimes considered as an exception to rules 
governing dominance interactions, because of their tendency 
to engage in coalitions and “dependent dominance” (Jolly 
1972; Chase 1980), whereby an animal’s dominance rank can 
dependent on that of its kin or associates. Similarly, maternal 
rank inheritance in spotted hyenas (Dloniak et al. 2006) com-
plicates any attempt to develop universal rules for establish-
ment of dominance hierarchies and their orderliness. Such 
complications might seem to be restricted to primates and the 
complex societies of some carnivores and cetaceans. Neverthe-
less, coalitions as durable, and perhaps more striking (McDon-
ald and Potts 1994; McDonald 2010) occur in birds. The results 
of this meta-analysis failed to find any dramatic differences 
between primates and other taxon groups (compare values for 
the various network metrics found in Appendix 2). Our goal, 
however, was not to compare metrics across taxa, but to pro-
pose a framework for assessing dominance structures and to 
use that framework to assess the generality of orderliness in 
animal societies characterized by dominance interactions. 
Our findings suggest that fundamental properties of transi-
tivity, hierarchy steepness and rank stability either do not re-
quire complex social cognition, or that biologists may have 
tended to underestimate the social cognitive abilities of other 
taxa. Furthermore, this general orderliness raises the interest-
ing prospect of a certain degree of self-organization in animal 
societies, whereby benefits to orderliness exist even for lower 
ranking animals, despite Maynard Smith’s (1983) conjecture 
that low-ranking animals might almost never having anything 
to lose from disrupting orderly queues. 
Supplementary Material (Appendix 1–3) can be found following the 
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Appendix 2. The 40 dominance datasets and associated metrics. Numbers in the first column refer to the numbered references in Appendix 1.  
Ref Taxon Nodes Edges Dnst Contests Draws PrDraw RkDf ExpRkDf Cycles OutcDns GlbClus TraTri TraPval NmStIx Gini LrzAsm Gini4
1 Dogfish 10 28 0.62 267 0 0.00 NA 3.67 0 0.622 0.750 1.000 0.000 0.883 0.148 0.95 0.06
2 African elephant 11 25 0.45 44 0 0.00 NA 4.00 0 0.455 0.419 1.000 0.000 0.571 0.087 0.94 0.03
3 Caribou 20 177 0.91 823 2 0.01 2.5 7.00 18 0.932 0.935 0.922 0.000 0.864 0.239 0.98 0.06
4 Macaque 22 182 0.77 859 2 0.01 3.5 7.67 6 0.788 0.816 0.970 0.000 0.884 0.223 0.92 0.05
5 Feral cat * 13 54 0.68 360 2 0.04 2.5 4.67 7 0.692 0.745 0.733 0.000 0.876 0.166 0.95 0.04
6 Feral dog 27 267 0.74 1811 3 0.01 2.33 9.33 8 0.761 0.820 0.978 0.000 0.911 0.301 0.87 0.10
7 Baboon 12 65 0.97 617 1 0.02 1 4.33 0 0.985 0.984 1.000 0.000 0.922 0.292 0.77 0.09
8 Highland pony 17 126 0.90 802 3 0.02 5.33 6.00 0 0.926 0.933 1.000 0.000 0.886 0.249 0.80 0.04
9 Ant 16 36 0.29 200 0 0.00 NA 5.67 0 0.300 0.594 1.000 0.000 0.814 0.123 1.42 0.12
10 Pheasant 14 51 0.55 136 0 0.00 NA 5.00 6 0.560 0.553 0.619 0.003 0.722 0.118 1.12 0.02
11 Fem. mt. goat 38 409 0.57 760 7 0.02 6.29 13.00 25 0.582 0.608 0.943 0.000 0.772 0.188 0.85 0.03
12 Rhesus monkey 24 243 0.86 1270 1 0.00 2 8.33 3 0.880 0.895 0.992 0.000 0.921 0.281 0.91 0.05
13 Abert's squirrel 11 29 0.52 325 2 0.06 2.5 4.00 1 0.527 0.685 0.882 0.003 0.889 0.194 1.16 0.07
14 Fem. Mt. goat 30 189 0.42 305 4 0.02 4.75 10.33 13 0.434 0.486 0.868 0.000 0.642 0.127 0.83 0.03
15 Spotted hyena 25 60 0.20 162 1 0.02 2 8.67 0 0.200 0.439 1.000 0.000 0.738 0.098 1.20 0.08
16 Bighorn ewe 20 96 0.49 175 0 0.00 NA 7.00 0 0.505 0.614 1.000 0.000 0.772 0.136 0.97 0.05
17 Bighorn ram 11 27 0.49 191 0 0.00 NA 4.00 0 0.491 0.674 1.000 0.000 0.878 0.185 1.10 0.10
18 Badger * 14 45 0.48 122 6 0.12 4 5.00 2 0.495 0.518 0.837 0.001 0.663 0.112 0.91 0.05
19 Reindeer 13 70 0.88 1557 1 0.01 1 4.67 5 0.897 0.905 0.904 0.000 0.962 0.240 1.17 0.13
20 Capuchin 17 87 0.62 319 3 0.03 2 6.00 0 0.640 0.702 1.000 0.000 0.872 0.182 0.92 0.05
21 Jungle crow * 14 89 0.96 441 2 0.02 3 5.00 0 0.978 0.977 1.000 0.000 0.885 0.234 0.96 0.06
22 Langur 13 63 0.79 364 2 0.03 2 4.67 1 0.808 0.824 0.974 0.000 0.845 0.188 1.27 0.07
23 Baboon * 10 35 0.78 92 2 0.05 5 3.67 3 0.778 0.753 0.778 0.001 0.720 0.127 1.09 0.03
24 House sparrow 14 55 0.59 578 0 0.00 NA 5.00 0 0.604 0.619 1.000 0.000 0.940 0.225 1.13 0.08
25 Female chimp 18 47 0.30 65 0 0.00 NA 6.33 2 0.307 0.405 0.750 0.019 0.541 0.087 1.06 0.03
26 Salmon 11 53 0.95 1732 0 0.00 NA 4.00 0 0.964 0.965 1.000 0.000 0.975 0.409 0.75 0.11
27 Feral cat 14 28 0.30 64 0 0.00 NA 5.00 2 0.308 0.328 0.385 0.267 0.672 0.077 1.27 0.06
28 Shelduck 18 70 0.45 221 1 0.01 8 6.33 16 0.458 0.537 0.366 0.033 0.717 0.119 0.86 0.05
29 Mallard * 16 108 0.88 1160 4 0.04 7 5.67 47 0.900 0.916 0.551 0.000 0.858 0.180 0.90 0.06
30 Black brent * 19 83 0.47 187 4 0.05 4 6.67 8 0.485 0.443 0.680 0.000 0.602 0.117 0.96 0.03
31 Bison 22 90 0.38 112 0 0.00 NA 7.67 3 0.390 0.448 0.891 0.000 0.567 0.099 1.02 0.04
32 Ant 10 19 0.42 103 0 0.00 NA 3.67 0 0.422 0.487 1.000 0.000 0.828 0.108 1.36 0.08
33 Mandrill 11 54 0.97 1488 1 0.02 1 4.00 5 0.982 0.981 0.872 0.000 0.937 0.286 0.79 0.08
34 Kangaroo rat 12 65 0.97 350 0 0.00 NA 4.33 10 0.985 0.984 0.810 0.000 0.792 0.164 1.04 0.10
35 Jackdaw 10 40 0.89 542 0 0.00 NA 3.67 4 0.889 0.865 0.802 0.000 0.853 0.206 0.94 0.09
36 Blue jay 16 83 0.67 553 2 0.02 2 5.67 3 0.692 0.775 0.946 0.000 0.882 0.212 1.04 0.08
37 Harris's sparrow 10 44 0.98 511 0 0.00 NA 3.67 2 0.978 0.977 0.929 0.000 0.938 0.265 0.81 0.04
38 African elephant 20 69 0.35 103 2 0.03 1 7.00 2 0.363 0.421 0.875 0.000 0.592 0.100 1.06 0.03
39 Chimpanzee * 15 87 0.81 2231 1 0.01 2 5.33 1 0.829 0.861 0.985 0.000 0.973 0.250 1.30 0.13
40 Mt. sheep * 12 58 0.87 381 2 0.03 1.5 4.33 3 0.879 0.872 0.919 0.000 0.848 0.208 1.09 0.09
Mean 16.3 87.7 0.66 559.6 1.5 0.02 3.1 5.8 5.2 0.667 0.713 0.879 0.008 0.810 0.184 1.01 0.06
s.d. 6.17 77.6 0.23 553.3 1.71 0.02 1.95 2.06 8.78 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.042 0.124 0.074 0.17 0.03
Min 10 19 0.20 44 0.0 0.00 1.0 3.7 0.0 0.200 0.328 0.366 0.000 0.541 0.077 0.753 0.018
Max 38 409 0.98 2231 7.0 0.12 8.0 13.0 47.0 0.985 0.984 1.000 0.267 0.975 0.409 1.42 0.13
Appendix 3. Comparative transitive and temporal orderliness in dominance networks.  
 
 
1 
Appendix 3. Difference (mean and 95% CI) between the observed (empirical data) and expected (random) 
triad % from the triad census for the 40 dominance datasets. The y-axis is the % (among n-choose-3 observed 
triads in the data) of the seven triad types, minus the mean triad census % from 10,000 random networks (±95% 
CI). Thus, y-values are the difference between observed and expected % for the seven possible triad types 
depicted by the diagrams along the x-axis (see Fig. 1). Using % allows comparison across networks of different 
size. Full references and taxon descriptions can be found in Appendix 1.  
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